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Abstract 
We consider the presence of electorally motivated cycles in Greece’s fiscal policies from 
1974 to 2011 and find strong evidence of pre-electoral manipulation. In the election years 
the government’s primary balance deteriorates via increased expenditures. The political 
budget cycle appears subdued in the post-Maastricht treaty period, which implies tighter 
constraints on public finances. We demonstrate, however that the opportunistic 
manipulation of public finances lives on, albeit through a different channel. In particular, 
we produce evidence of electoral effects in the composition of expenditures, with the 
expenses for Compensation to Employees increasing during election years. Furthermore, 
our results show that snap elections affect expenses positively, while prolonged 
incumbencies affect negatively the government’s primary balance and revenues. Finally, 
no evidence of partisan effects exists in Greece’s fiscal policies.  
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1 Introduction 
The crisis in Greece and the country’s admission to the joint EU-IMF financial support 
program motivated a number of political economy analyses of the causes of Greece’s 
failure. Along with the country’s weak/inadequate institutions, the myopic, self-interested 
and opportunistically motivated ruling elites in Greece have often been identified as partly 
responsible for the country’s current economic predicament. Clientelis ic practices and 
rent-seeking activities that empower special interest groups at the expense of general 
economic well-being feature prominently as important contributing factors to the failures 
of the Greek economy. In this paper we study one aspect of these activities by focusing on 
the presence of opportunistically motivated cycles in Greece’s fiscal policies.  During the 
few decades before the crisis politicians faced only limited checks and balances and few 
restrictions in drawing up the budget and deciding over fiscal policies. This environment 
allowed incumbents to adopt opportunistic policies aiming to enhance their reelection 
prospects without being punished by the electorate for mismanaging public finances. We 
consider the electorally motivated budgetary decisions during two sub periods. The first is 
the full period from the restoration of democracy in Greece up until 2011 while the second 
starts after the Maastricht Treaty comes into effect in 1993, which introduced tougher 
restriction on the level of public deficit and debt. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty 
and in the run up to the adoption of the euro, countries aspiring to join the Eurozone had to 
demonstrate compliance with the criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty and therefore 
policymakers enjoyed fewer degrees of freedom in pursuing discretionary policies. Our 
study advances the understanding of opportunistic fiscal policies in Greece in many ways. 
First, we extend the time range of the analysis. Second, we expand the analysis to the 
previously unexplored effect of elections on the composition of expenditures in order to 
investigate the presence of politically induced cycles beyond the most commonly studied 
areas of public revenues, expenses and government’s primary balance. Third, we consider 
the implications of the Maastricht Treaty restrictions on budgetary policies which tighten 
the budget constraint of the countries that want to join the euro area. Finally, this is the first 
attempt to study the effect of snap elections, a commn practice in Greece’s politics, and 
the previously unexplored effect of prolonged incumbencies on public finances. 
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We use data from various sources:  IMF’s Historical Public Debt Database (Abbas et 
al., 2010), IMF’s Government Financial Statistics database (GFS) and the Hellenic 
Statistical Authority. We also use a number of political variables, collected by the authors.. 
Our results uncover strong evidence of electoral cycles from 1974 to 2011, which can 
largely be attributed to the subsample 1974-1993. Once the constraints of the Maastricht 
treaty kick in the electoral cycles in fiscal policies seem to disappear.  A clear electoral 
effect exists, however, on the composition of expenditures. We also document that snap 
elections are associated with increased expenses and that prolonged incumbencies 
negatively affect the primary balance and revenues. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on 
political budget cycles focusing on previous analyses of Greece’s political cycle. Section 3 
describes the data and our estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the results of our analysis 
and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Political Budget Cycles 
Political business cycles refer to cyclical fluctuations in governments’ policies that 
occur along the electoral cycle. The economic voting hypothesis, i.e., the effect that the 
state of the economy has on electoral support of the government, backed by numerous 
studies published over a large period of time1, provides opportunistic politicians with the 
motive to enhance voters’ well-being before elections to boost their chances to get 
reelected. 
Nordhaus (1975) was the first to provide a model of opportunistically motivated 
politicians who try to secure re-election by exploiting the short-term Phillips curve. His 
model was criticized for implying naïve and irrational voters that can be deceived 
perpetually, while empirical evidence failed to support his hypothesis.2 Since then, as a 
                                                          
1 Early studies include among others Kramer (1971), Fair (1978), Madsen (1980) and Lewis-Beck (1988). 
Nannestad and Paldam (1994) review early evidence. More recent studies include among others Swank and 
Eisinga (1999), Feld and Kirchgässner (2000), Chappell and Veiga (2000) and Tucker (2001). For reviews 
of the evidence see Chortareas (1999) and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013). 
2 Alesina et al. (1997) conclude that there is no evidence of pre-electoral increase in economic activity in the 
US at it is also the case in other countries (see Lewis-Beck, 1988; Paldam, 1979). With regard to higher post 
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recent literature survey indicates, more than 540 articles and books on political business 
cycles have been publish over that period (Dubois, 2016).  
The view that politicians have the incentive to adopt more targetable policies prior to 
election has shifted attention to fiscal policy manipulation i.e. political budget cycles, with 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) being among the first to present a model of rational voter 
behavior, where candidates have the incentive to signal their ‘competency’ by engaging in 
expansionary fiscal policy before elections. Extensive and robust empirical findings 
indicate that politicians manipulate fiscal policies before elections and suggest the 
occurrence of political budget cycles across developed and developing economies. 
Tufte (1978) was among the first to provide evidence of electoral cycles focusing on 
direct transfers, while Frey and Schneider (1978a, 1978b) show increases in government 
expenditures prior to elections in both the US and the UK. Krueger and Turan (1993) find 
pre electoral fiscal manipulation i Turkey and Gonzalez (2002) identifies the presence of 
political business cycles in Mexico. Studies at the multi-country level include Ames 
(1987), who provides evidence of political cycles in government expenditures for 17 Latin 
American countries, Block (2002), who reveals pre-electoral expansionary fiscal policy in 
44 sub-Saharan African countries and Schuknecht (1996), who provides similar results for 
35 developing countries. 
Recent evidence identifies the importance of several factors in conditioning the 
occurrence and size of PBCs at the national level. For instance, Shi and Svensson (2006) 
consider the level of economic development and document that PBCs occur both in 
developed and developing countries but their magnitude is larger in the latter. Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) argue that constitutional features like the electoral system and the form of 
government are important in explaining variation in PBCs across countries.  Brender and 
Drazen (2005) attribute the occurrence of PBCs to the age of democracy and elections held 
in newly established democracies, where voters have relatively limited experience with 
democratic processes. Contrary to this view, Alt and Lassen (2006), focus on transparency 
and argue that PBCs can also emerge in old established democracies when budget 
institutions operate in an opaque environment. The effectiveness of checks and balances 
                                                          
electoral inflation, Alesina et al. (1997) find such evidence across OECD countries and the U.S. but for the 
latter only for the elections held before 1979. 
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(Streb et al., 2009) and the stringency of fiscal rules  (Rose, 2006) are also significant in 
explaining the presence of opportunistic fiscal cycles. Klomp and De Haan (2013) 
reexamine the literature on PBCs and provide supportive evidence regarding their 
occurrence, which is found to be conditional on various political and institutional features 
like the ones already mentioned.3 
Opportunistically induced cycles tend to be of greater magnitude in developing 
countries and new democracies, while in old democracies larger deficits occurring during 
the election year have a negative impact on the possibility of reelection. Brender and 
Drazen (2008) shifted research on PBCs towards subnational governments, effects on the 
composition of expenditures and on other policy instruments like public employment.  
A number of studies reveal the presence of political budget cycles in local governments 
(e.g., Veiga and Veiga,2007; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2011, Sjahrir et al., 2013), while 
other research focuse  on the composition of expenditures.  For example, Drazen and 
Eslava (2010) consider cycles in Colombian municipalities and show shifts in the pre-
electoral composition of local government expenditures towards visible expenses such as 
infrastructure spending, while at the same time other less visible types of expenses like 
interest payments contract. Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) also suggest that elections affect 
the composition of fiscal policy in both developed and established democracies, 
documenting shifts towards current expenditures at the cost of capital investment for 19 
OECD economies. 
 
2.2 Political Cycles in Greece 
A number of studies investigate aspects of the political-economic nexus in Greece, 
while some of them explicitly focus on the effect of elections on incumbents’ policies. 
Alogoskoufis and Philippopoulos (1992) study the interaction between inflation, 
unemployment, the exchange rate regime, and political parties in Greece from 1958 to 
1989, and suggest that under floating exchange rates left-wing administrations in Greece 
were associated with higher on average inflation rate, albeit without any negative effect on 
unemployment. Yet, when Alogoskoufis et al. (1998) take into account structural equations 
                                                          
3 For a review of the relevant literature see Drazen (2000), Franzese and Jusko (2006), and  De Haan and 
Klomp (2013). 
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for wage inflation, price inflation and unemployment, their results show that there are no 
partisan differences in inflation; a finding that also explains the aforementioned absence of 
partisan cycles in unemployment. Bratsiotis (2000) argues that the Single European Act 
signed in 1986 had an important effect on partisan inflation cycles in Greece, with left-
wing governments in Greece, being associated with higher levels of inflation before the act 
but not afterwards as a more anti-inflationary stance was adopted.  
Studies on the presence of partisan and electoral effects in Greece do not only focus on 
inflation and unemployment but also on other policy instruments. For instance 
Andrikopoulos et al. (1998) use cointegration analysis and find evidence supporting the 
presence of electoral cycles in economic outcomes as well as some electoral and partisan 
effects on policy instruments. Laopodis et al. (2016) also report on the effects o  Greece’s 
politics on the economy and argue that the two main political parties that have been 
alternating in power are associated with increased budget deficits. The authors use an 
unrestricted VAR model for the period 1970–2 14 to test the impact of each of the two 
main parties on the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio during election and non-election years 
controlling for the role of tax evasion. Similarly, Lockwood et al. (2001) use annual data 
from 1960 to 1997 and provide evidence that pre-election years are associated with rising 
expenditures and falling taxes, an effect that becomes weaker in the post Maastricht period, 
namely after 1993. Their evidence also suggests that between 1974 and 1992 no partisan 
differences are to be found in Greece regarding the fiscal policies adopted by the Socialist 
and Conservative governments.  
Another set of studies shift the focus of electoral effects beyond fiscal policy instruments 
and economic outcomes. For example, Siokis and Kapopoulos (2007) provide evidence on 
the presence of partisan and electoral effects in the Athens Stock Exchange from 1988 to 
2004 with volatility increasing more in the period before elections and during right wing 
incumbencies. Skouras and Christodoulakis (2014) explore the role of electoral effects on 
misgovernance in Greece. More specifically they investigate how elections affect two 
different aspects of state administrative responsibilities, that of controlling wildfires and 
fighting tax evasion. They show that around elections both wildfires and tax evasion 
increase. They attribute this to electoral campaigning that negatively affects governing, and 
to the relaxing of law enforcement that may benefit specific segments of the electorate and 
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interest groups. In addition, they show that elections affect certain subcategories of tax 
revenues documenting the presence of adverse electoral effects on revenues from 
transaction taxes.  
Chortareas et al. (2016a) study the presence of political budget cycles in Greece's 
municipalities. They produce evidence of pre-electoral manipulation through increased 
expenditures and excessive borrowing that occurs irrespective of whether a mayor is 
running for re-election or is aligned with the central government. Cycles at the municipal 
level are present in the post-Maastricht period with increased expenditures and election 
year opportunistic excesses positively affecting incumbents' re-election prospects. 
Chortareas et al. (2016b) consider the composition of employment in terms of employment 
relationship and find evidence of pre-electoral manipulation in municipal employment. 
Their evidence shows that increases in the number of municipal employees during election 
years can be attributed to increases in contract employees. 
 
3 Data and Estimation Strategy 
3.1 Data 
 
Our annual data on the Greek government’s revenues, expenditures and its primary 
balance were obtained from IMF’s historical debt database (Abbas et al.; 2010). The time 
span of our investigation ranges from 1974, the year during which democracy was restored 
in Greece, up to 2011, the last year for which data are available in the database. During the 
time dimension of our investigation 13 elections were held in years 1974, 1977, 1981, 
1985, twice in 1989, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007 and 2009. The data we use on 
the composition of expenditures come from IMF’s Government Financial Statistics 
database and cover five subcategories namely the compensation of employees, expenses on 
the use of goods and services, interest expenses, subsidies and social benefits, with data 
being available from 1995 and onwards. Data on the population structure and 
unemployment come for the Hellenic Statistical Authority (HSA). The political variables 
used were collected by the authors. Descriptive Statistics of the variables used are 
presented in Appendix A, Table A.1. 
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3.2 Estimation  
We estimate a model that uses a typical political budget cycle specification of the form: 
 � � = + � �−1 + � �� � + � � + �                                         (1) 
 
where the dependent variable �  denotes each one of the j fiscal variables used, �j −1 is the 
lag of the dependent variable used to capture persistence in the fiscal variables, �  is a
vector of k control variables, and Electionsit is a dummy variable capturing the electoral 
effect. The dummy variable takes the value of one in election years and zero otherwise. 
The term  represents the i.i.d. error term. The vector �  includes economic, demographic 
and political explanatory variables. The economic variables include Greece’s 
unemployment rate and real GDP’s growth rate. The demographic variables are the 
percentages of the population under 15 years old and over 65 years old (%Pop<15, 
%Pop>65), which can capture the effects of population structure. The political variable, 
aiming to capture partisan effects, i  a variable that takes the value of -1 during the years 
where the incumbent was of left-wing political orientation, the value of 0 if the incumbent 
did not belong to either left or right wing party or in case of coalition governments, and the 
value of 1 if the incumbent was of right-wing political orientation. A set of unit-root tests 
suggest that most of the fiscal variables used contain a unit root so we first difference our 
data to avoid misleading inference. Political and demographic variables enter our 
estimation in levels.4   
 
4 Results 
4.1 Baseline Evidence 
Table 1 presents our baseline results. Columns (1) to (3) shows results from estimating 
Eq. (1) when we do not include a linear time trend in our specification, while Columns (4) 
                                                          
4 Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.  
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to (6) shows results when we do. Our evidence suggests that Political Budget Cycles are to 
be found in Greece’s finances with our results being similar both with and without a linear 
time trend. The results also show the effect of parliamentary elections on fiscal policies 
adopted. More specifically, from 1974 to 2011, elections had a negative effect on 
government's primary balance [Columns (1) and (4)].  Results in Columns (3) and (6) 
indicate that this can be attributed to increased expenses that occur during election years. 
The respective coefficient of the Elections dummy is significant at the 5% significance 
level when primary balance is the dependent variable (whether we include a linear time 
trend or not), while when we use government expenses as the dependent variables the 
coefficient is significant at the 1% significance level when we do not include a linear time 
trend and at the 5% level when we do. Our results suggest that during election years the 
annual change in government’s primary balance (as a % of GDP) deteriorates by 2.098, 
while the annual change in government’s expenses (as a % of GDP) increase by 1.746 (both 
figures correspond to the case when a linear time trend is included in our specification). 
With respect to the other variables used, evidence shows the absence of partisan effects on 
Greece’s fiscal policies. This finding is similar to the one that Lockwood et al. (2001) 
provide, where they document that no differences in effects on fiscal policies can be found 
between right-wing and left-wing governments in Greece. Moreover, our results 
demonstrate that the population structure affects fiscal policies. Specifically, higher 
percentages of the population above 65 years old and below 14 years old negatively affect 
the primary balance via a negative effect on revenues and a positive effect on expenses.   
 
< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
As Brender and Drazen (2005) document the importance of the "new democracy" effect 
in the emergence of Political Budget Cycles we test if opportunistic cycles in Greece 
disappear with the maturing of democratic institutions. Following Brender and Drazen 
(2005) who consider the first four elections after a country has acquired democratic 
institutions to be the ones corresponding to the “new democracy” status, we restrict our 
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sample to the years after 1985 to capture the “mature democracy” period.5 Contrary to the 
evidence provided by these authors that Political Budget Cycles cease in mature 
democracies we show that they are present in Greece in both its mature and immature 
phases. Table 2, Columns (1) to (3) suggest that opportunistic politics remain present 
throughout as the effect of elections in the years after 1985 and up until 2011 is similar to 
our baseline findings, i.e., a deterioration in the primary balance due to increases in 
expenditures. Once again, partisan effects are absent as the coefficient of the partisan
variable is not statistically significant. 
With regards to the presence of Political Budget Cycles it is only after the Maastricht 
treaty is implemented that electoral effects disappear. Table 2, Columns (4) to (6), presents 
estimation results when we restrict our sample to the post-1993 period. Evidence shows 
that there are no electoral effects as the coefficient of the Elections dummy is not significant 
for any of the fiscal variables used. This finding corroborates similar results in other studies 
that also suggest the absence of electoral effects after the coming into force of the 
Maastricht treaty and during the run-up to the EMU (see for example Lockwood et al., 
2001). 
  
< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
Yet, as Political Budget Cycles tend to emerge where we can’t see them (Alt and Lassen, 
2005), a number of studies focus on the effect of elections on the composition of 
expenditures and not just on their overall level.6 Table 3 presents our results when we 
consider the composition of expenditures in Greece. Since data are available only after 
1995, we cover the years after the implementing of the Maastricht treaty and up until 2011, 
a period where no electoral effects are to be found in government expenses as we 
documented before. We retain our analysis at the level of general government expenses for 
compatibility with the data from IMF's Historical Debt Database (Abbas et al., 2010) used 
before. Results in columns (1) to (5) document that elections positively affect the 
                                                          
5 In 1985 the fourth election after the restoration of democracy was held with elections in 1974, 1977 and 
1981 being the previous three ones. 
6 Brender and Drazen (2008) argues that in advanced democracies fiscal imprudence before elections 
negatively affects an incumbent’s re-election prospects as deficit adverse voters punish opportunistic politics.   
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Compensation to Employees subcategory of expenditures as the respective coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding corroborates the empirical findings in 
Chortareas et al. (2016b) that document pre-electoral increases in municipal employment.  
 
< INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE > 
 
4.2 Extensions and Further Evidence 
We first examine how the year before elections affects fiscal policy. For this we 
introduce a Years Before Elections dummy that takes the value of one in the year before 
elections and zero otherwise. Evidence presented in Table 4, Columns (1) to (3), shows 
that the deterioration in government’s primary balance starts in the year prior to elections 
as the coefficient of the dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Nevertheless, this deterioration is not due to increased expenses but due to a negative effect 
on the revenue side. The coefficients of the Elections dummy remain qualitatively the same 
as in our baseline specification. This is also the case with the rest of the variables.  
Since numerous elections in Greece from 1974 to 2011 were held before the end of the 
constitutionally mandated government term (4 years) we test the effect of snap elections 
on government policies. For this we substitute our Elections dummy with a SnapElections 
dummy variable that takes the value of one in the years where snap elections were held and 
zero otherwise.7 Our results presented in Table 4, Columns (4) to (6), indicate that snap 
elections are associated with increased expenses as the respective coefficient has a positive 
sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Finally, we test the effect of prolonged incumbencies on fiscal policies. We introduce a 
YearsinOffice variable that counts the number of years a party has been in office. Evidence 
presented in Table 4, columns (7) to (9), suggest that prolonged incumbencies have a 
negative effect on the primary balance and revenues as the respective coefficients are both 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.   
                                                          
7 We code as snap elections the elections that occurred in any year before the on corresponding to the final 
(fourth) of a government’s term.  
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< INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper considers the presence of p litical budget cycles in Greece as a 
manifestation of clientelistic and rent seeking practices. We study the years from the 
restoration of democracy up until 2011 and focus on the general government’s primary 
balance, expenses and revenues. For the years after 1995, where data are available, we also 
study how elections affect the composition of expenditures. Moreover, we investigate how 
snap elections and prolonged incumbencies affect public finances. Our results provide 
evidence on the existence of politically induced cycles in Greece’s public finance and 
verify previous studies that document the absence of such effects in the aftermath of the 
Maastricht treaty. Yet, in contract to a popular and casual interpretation, our results suggest 
that the opportunistically induced cycles did not vanish after 1993. Instead they manifest 
themselves in different and more subtle ways, and in particular in the composition of 
expenditures. More specifically, our results document the presence of electoral effect in 
the Compensation to Employees subcategory of expenses. Our evidence also suggests that 
snap elections are associated with a deterioration in public finances as they positively affect 
expenses. Prolonged incumbencies are found to negatively affect the primary balance and 
revenues; a finding that suggests a more relaxed attitude on behalf of the incumbents with 
respect to public finances. We show the absence of partisan effects. Politicians in Greece 
are found to be opportunistically motivated and have remained so even in the presence of 
strict rules with regard to fiscal policies as those ushered in after 1993. The emergence of 
political cycles in the composition of expenditures suggest that more profound checks and 
balances should be put into force to deter the well-established and long standing 
opportunistic behavior adopted by incumbents before elections.  
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Tables  
Table 1: Baseline Evidence (1974-2011) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Primary Balance Revenues Expend Primary Balance Revenues Expend 
       
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.356** -0.0915 -0.404*** -0.346** -0.0846 -0.407*** 
 (0.159) (0.124) (0.134) (0.161) (0.124) (0.130) 
Elections -2.153** -0.405 1.742*** -2.098** -0.397 1.746** 
 (0.786) (0.545) (0.618) (0.781) (0.558) (0.625) 
Real GDP growth rate 0.167 0.0201 -0.137 0.176 0.0207 -0.136 
 (0.308) (0.160) (0.191) (0.313) (0.165) (0.192) 
unemployment  0.880** 0.278 -0.353 0.660** 0.251 -0.366 
 (0.417) (0.203) (0.240) (0.291) (0.179) (0.278) 
%Pop>65 -1.250** -0.590** 0.449* -2.345*** -0.719 0.383 
 (0.514) (0.262) (0.259) (0.797) (0.522) (0.511) 
%Pop<14 -0.957** -0.368** 0.639*** -0.342 -0.292 0.677** 
 (0.404) (0.174) (0.201) (0.421) (0.275) (0.320) 
Partisan 0.150 0.0840 0.434 -0.0693 0.0555 0.422 
 (0.523) (0.264) (0.328) (0.487) (0.232) (0.361) 
Linear Time Trend    0.466* 0.0563 0.0282 
    (0.250) (0.173) (0.180) 
Constant 36.71** 16.33** -17.49** -886.6* -95.30 -73.32 
 (14.97) (6.939) (7.252) (493.0) (342.3) (356.3) 
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31 
R2 0.41 0.16 0.60 0.46 0.17 0.60 
F 3.636 1.395 12.77 4.939 1.518 11.08 
Notes: The elections dummy takes the value of one during election years and zero otherwise. Estimates are based on OLS regressions and Newey-West standard 
errors. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1,5, and 10-percnt level respectively. 
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Table 2: Restricted Sample 
 1986-2011 1994-2011 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Primary Balance Revenues Expend Primary Balance Revenues Expend 
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.375** -0.0306 -0.532*** -0.390 -0.0510 -0.636*** 
 (0.163) (0.114) (0.0762) (0.235) (0.335) (0.0988) 
Elections -1.879* -0.201 1.660** -1.296 0.101 1.508 
 (0.973) (0.618) (0.645) (1.242) (0.665) (0.984) 
Real GDP growth rate 0.236 -0.00771 -0.227 0.886** 0.520* -0.334 
 (0.357) (0.187) (0.169) (0.360) (0.245) (0.267) 
unemployment 1.090*** 0.106 -0.986*** 1.551** 0.759 -1.162* 
 (0.304) (0.224) (0.284) (0.610) (0.533) (0.594) 
%Pop>65 0.0114 -1.424 -3.217** 2.902 -1.589 -6.452** 
 (1.843) (0.983) (1.265) (3.846) (2.190) (2.284) 
%Pop<14 -0.234 -0.387 0.381 2.271 -1.052 -1.596 
 (0.590) (0.292) (0.319) (1.960) (1.815) (1.440) 
Linear Time Trend -0.190 0.241 0.991** -0.555 0.137 1.552** 
 (0.469) (0.239) (0.374) (0.837) (0.274) (0.592) 
Partisan 0.303 0.0562 0.122 0.631 0.967 0.270 
 (0.539) (0.287) (0.369) (1.426) (1.059) (0.889) 
Constant 384.2 -450.7 -1,933** 1,026 -230.4 -2,970** 
 (908.7) (461.8) (728.9) (1,594) (512.4) (1,151) 
Observations 26 26 26 18 18 18 
R2 0.40 0.16 0.68 0.66 0.42 0.74 
F 3.908 1.159 16.37 6.585 3.466 15.48 
Notes: See Table 1 
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Table 3: Composition of Expenditures (1995-2011) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Compens Employees GoodsnServices InterExp Subsidies SocBen 
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.273 -0.385 -0.104 -0.585 -0.768** 
 (0.153) (0.244) (0.143) (0.374) (0.299) 
lections 0.566** 0.498 -0.0673 0.000943 0.179 
 (0.210) (0.418) (0.276) (0.0544) (0.465) 
Real GDP growth rate -0.227*** 0.0631 0.0584 0.00398 -0.00305 
 (0.0549) (0.0615) (0.0843) (0.0127) (0.135) 
unemployment -0.253** 0.0531 0.429 0.0649 0.0732 
 (0.0984) (0.124) (0.273) (0.0373) (0.168) 
%Pop>65 -0.125 -0.702 -0.942 0.0656 -3.524*** 
 (0.218) (0.756) (0.661) (0.176) (0.761) 
%Pop<14 1.097** -1.871** -2.327 -0.244 -2.432*** 
 (0.416) (0.633) (1.299) (0.139) (0.623) 
Partisan -0.192 0.257 0.343 -0.0340 0.369 
 (0.124) (0.225) (0.332) (0.0459) (0.206) 
Linear Time Trend 0.130 -0.0717 0.0705 -0.0227 0.696** 
 (0.0784) (0.149) (0.140) (0.0436) (0.200) 
Constant -275.4 184.2 -89.83 47.97 -1,294** 
 (159.5) (283.6) (286.0) (84.06) (387.0) 
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 
R2 0.84 0.73 0.89 0.83 0.75 
F 31.64 20.39 44.79 37.74 31.56 
Notes: See Table 1 
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Table 4: Further Evidence (1974-2011) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Primary Balance Revenues Expend Primary Balance Revenues Expend Primary Balance Revenues Expend 
          
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.330** -0.127 -0.359*** -0.320** -0.0862 -0.409*** -0.300 -0.0264 -0.382** 
 (0.132) (0.140) (0.124) (0.135) (0.141) (0.123) (0.196) (0.121) (0.149) 
Year before Elections -1.323* -0.608* 0.843 -0.795 -0.455 0.397    
 (0.644) (0.352) (0.507) (0.664) (0.328) (0.474)    
Elections -2.488*** -0.593 1.948***    -2.612** -0.669 1.911** 
 (0.812) (0.603) (0.622)    (0.931) (0.619) (0.730) 
Real GDP growth rate 0.249 0.0613 -0.195 0.283 0.0735 -0.199 0.162 0.0139 -0.139 
 (0.282) (0.151) (0.174) (0.314) (0.152) (0.203) (0.284) (0.142) (0.192) 
unemployment 0.870* 0.288 -0.350 0.992** 0.308 -0.457* 0.515 0.0730 -0.234 
 (0.439) (0.217) (0.230) (0.465) (0.220) (0.248) (0.405) (0.184) (0.283) 
%Pop>65 -1.205** -0.607** 0.425* -1.344** -0.586* 0.609** -1.072** -0.480* 0.403 
 (0.498) (0.283) (0.242) (0.566) (0.332) (0.277) (0.473) (0.249) (0.266) 
%Pop<14 -0.945** -0.389* 0.627*** -1.085** -0.383 0.801*** -0.896** -0.331* 0.625*** 
 (0.402) (0.190) (0.192) (0.453) (0.226) (0.238) (0.373) (0.165) (0.206) 
Partisan 0.284 0.166 0.327 0.250 0.114 0.321 -0.376 -0.223 0.599 
 (0.497) (0.261) (0.321) (0.648) (0.292) (0.402) (0.609) (0.320) (0.398) 
SnapEle    -1.642 -0.182 1.632*    
    (1.037) (0.602) (0.886)    
YrsinOffice       -0.308** -0.175** 0.107 
       (0.115) (0.0703) (0.109) 
Constant 36.39** 17.26** -17.31** 40.31** 16.58* -22.71** 34.25** 14.70** -17.03** 
 (14.59) (7.528) (6.807) (16.47) (9.022) (8.375) (13.81) (6.700) (7.308) 
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
R2 0.46 0.20 0.63 0.34 0.17 0.53 0.47 0.23 0.61 
F 3.761 2.218 11.80 1.687 1.504 6.340 4.457 2.365 11.51 
Notes: See Table 1          
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
Revenues 38 33.30 6.759 20.86 43.35 
Expenditures 38 40.75 7.678 25.26 53.81 
Primary Balance 38 -1.762 3.444 -10.64 4.368 
Elections 38 0.316 0.471 0 1 
Unemployment 32 9.096 2.678 2.663 17.85 
%Pop>65 38 15.25 2.395 12.03 19.36 
%Pop<014 38 18.51 3.461 14.60 24.07 
Partisan 38 -0.105 0.981 -1 1 
Year before Elections 38 0.316 0.471 0 1 
SnapEle 38 0.184 0.393 0 1 
YrsinOffice 38 4.132 2.772 0 11 
CompEmployees 17 11.05 0.941 9.600 13.10 
GoodsnServices 17 5.800 0.573 4.800 6.700 
InterExp 17 6.459 1.963 4.400 10.70 
Subsidies 17 0.1000 0.150 0 0.600 
SocBen 17 16.16 3.022 12.90 22.90 
 
 
 
 
